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VII. Labor Law
A. Summary Judgment in Unfair Labor Practice Cases-
NLRB v. E-Z Davies Chevrolet, 395 F.2d 191
(9th Cir. 1968).
The question of whether or not the NLRB can proceed to sum-
mary judgment in an unfair labor practice case was answered affirm-
atively by the Ninth Circuit in NLRB v. E-Z Davies Chevrolet. The
Board's use of summary judgment was approved by the court because
the respondent, E-Z Davies, failed to raise factual issues which could
be resolved only after an evidentiary hearing. Thus, in a proper case,
no evidentiary hearing need be afforded an employer who objects to
an order by the Board to bargain with a newly selected employee
bargaining representative.
Involved in the facts of the E-Z Davies case is the labyrinth of
procedures governing collective bargaining representation elections2
and the unfair labor practice proceedings 3 which may follow these
elections. In E-Z Davies, the company's automobile salesmen selected
a local of the Teamsters Union,4 in a representation election, to repre-
sent them in collective bargaining proceedings with management.
The company refused to bargain with the selected local, thus commit-
ting the unfair labor practice which led ultimately to the Ninth
Circuit's decision. The E-Z Davies representation election had been
held at the order of an NLRB Regional Director 5 pursuant to a petition
1 395 F.2d 191 (9th Cir. 1968), enforcing 161 N.L.R.B. 1380 (1966).
2 Representation procedures governing section 9(c) of the National La-
bor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1964), are covered under the NLRB rules
in 29 C.F.R. §§ 102.60-.72 (1968).
3 Unfair labor practice procedures governing sections 10(a) to (i) of the
National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 160(a)-(i) (1964), are covered under
the NLRB rules in 29 C.F.R. §§ 102.9-.59 (1968).
4 Professional Automobile Salesmen, Drivers, and Demonstrators, Local
No. 960, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen,
and Helpers of America [hereinafter referred to as the Union].
5 Full responsibility for representation proceedings has been exercised
by NLRB Regional Directors since 1961. This responsibility was formerly
vested solely in the Board. The Board delegated the responsibility to the
Regional Directors after Congress amended section 3(b) of the National Labor
Relations Act in 1959 to allow for such delegation. 29 U.S.C. § 153(b) (1964).
Petitions for representation elections are filed with the Regional Director.
29 C.F.R. § 102.60 (1968). The Director then investigates to see whether or
not there is "reasonable cause to believe that a question of representation
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filed with him by the union. The company objected to the election
and its results on the grounds that the bargaining unit was inappro-
priate and that the union observer at the election was a non-employee
union officer.6 Although the company did not allege any conduct on
the part of the union official which might have affected the fairness of
the election, it, nevertheless, contended that the mere presence of a
union officer as an observer was enough to invalidate the election
results.
The NLRB Regional Director rejected E-Z Davies' contentions
on the basis of his staff's investigation, and without an evidentiary
hearing covering the company's objections,7 and certified the union
as the salesmen's bargaining agent. The company appealed this
ruling to the Board,8 but the Board declined to review the Regional
Director's decision and denied a subsequent company request to re-
consider.9 At that point, the company refused to recognize or bargain
with the union.10 As a result, the Board's general counsel issued a
complaint charging the company with failing to bargain, a violation
of section 8(a) (5) of the National Labor Relations Act.11
affecting commerce exists, that the policies of the act will be effectuated, and
that an election will reflect the free choice of employees in the appropriate
unit. . . ." 29 C.F.R. § 102.63 (a) (1968). If the Director so finds and decides
that there will be an election, his decision is subject to appeal to the Board.
29 C.F.R. § 102.67 (1968).
6 NLRB v. E-Z Davies Chevrolet, 395 F.2d 191 (9th Cir. 1968).
7 With regard to objections to conduct of an election or conduct affect-
ing the result of an election, see 29 C.F.R. § 102.69 (1968). Under this rule the
Regional Director may investigate charges, decide the case, and certify the
result of the election without a hearing on the objections if it appears to the
Regional Director that the objections do not present "substantial and material
factual issues." If such issues exist, the rules call for the Regional Director to
cause an evidentiary hearing to be held for their resolution. 29 C.F.R. § 102.69
(c) (1968).
8 If the Regional Director overrules objections to the election, the object-
ing party has the right to a review by the Board if the party alleges one or
more of the following:
"(1) That a substantial question of law or policy is raised because of (i)
the absence of, or (ii) a departure from, officially reported Board precedent.
"(2) That the regional director's decision on a substantial factual issue is
clearly erroneous on the record and such error prejudicially affects the rights
of a party.
"(3) That the conduct of the hearing or any ruling made in connection
with the proceeding has resulted in prejudicial error.
"(4) That there are compelling reasons for reconsideration of an impor-
tant Board rule or policy." 29 C.F.R. § 102.67(c) (1968).
9 The Board's "[d] enial of a request for review [constitutes] an affirm-
ance of the regional director's action .... " 29 C.F.R. § 102.67(f) (1968).
10 395 F.2d 191 (9th Cir. 1968).
11 National Labor Relation Act § 8(a) (5), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (a) (5) (1964).
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E-Z Davies answered the complaint by a general denial that its
conduct amounted to an unfair labor practice. The NLRB's general
counsel then asked for summary judgment against the company by
motion made directly to the Board,'2 in an attempt to by-pass the
trial portion of the unfair labor practice proceeding. There followed a
Board order to E-Z Davies to show cause why the motion should not
be granted. The company responded to the order by arguing that the
Board had no authority to grant motions for summary judgment. The
company asserted that the Board could not rule on complaints with-
out conducting an evidentiary hearing and that summary unfair labor
practice proceedings were not sanctioned by the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act (APA) or by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).
The motion, however, was granted, and the Board ordered the com-
pany to bargain with the union.
The case came before the Ninth Circuit on the Board's petition
for enforcement of its order to bargain. In an opinion written by
Judge Ely, the court stated "we hold that the Board properly granted
motions for summary judgment. This issue is adequately discussed
and properly resolved in the Board's reported opinions in the pres-
ent proceeding."'13
The main issue presented by E-Z Davies is whether the Board
has the legal power to grant summary judgment under the facts
stated.14 It appears from the holding that summary proceedings in
an unfair labor practice case are not precluded by the provisions of
either the Administrative Procedure Act or the National Labor Re-
lations Act. Also, the Board's denial of an evidentiary hearing to
an objecting employer in both the representation proceeding and the
subsequent unfair labor practice proceeding is neither contrary to law
nor a denial of due process.15 The result of E-Z Davies is the Ninth
Circuit's approval of the Board's application of the "substantial and
material issues" test to unfair labor practice proceedings as well as
to representation proceedings. 6
Substantial and Material Factual Issues Test
The "substantial and material issues" test 17 has been used by the
12 E-Z Davies Chevrolet, 161 N.L.R.B. 1380, 1381 (1966).
13 395 F.2d 191, 193 (9th Cir. 1968).
14 Id.
15 See E-Z Davies Chevrolet, 161 N.L.R.B. 1380 (1966).
1' Accord, Sonoco Prods. Co. v. NLRB, 399 F.2d 835 (9th Cir. 1968).
In this later case the court held in remanding to the Board on similar facts
for a hearing "that the 'substantial and material factual issues' test ....
[was the standard by which the court judged] the correctness of the Board's
failure to grant petitioner the hearing it sought." Id. at 839.
17 What constitutes "substantial and material factual issues" is not
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Board to determine whether an employer who objects to the conduct
of an election may have a hearing in the representation proceeding.
The Board promulgated the rule that hearings will be granted in
this proceeding when the party objecting to the certification of a
bargaining agent alleges substantial and material issues of fact which
may be resolved only after such a hearing.'8 Behind the rule and
the holdings of the Board is the fact that under the NLRA and the
APA a hearing in the representation proceeding is not a matter of
right. Under the National Labor Relations Act, whether there is
to be an evidentiary hearing in a representation case is discretionary
with the Board.19 The "substantial and material issues" test, as ap-
plied to the representation proceeding alone, has been upheld by the
Ninth20 and other circuits2 1 as reasonably within the discretion of
the Board under the NLRA. Representation proceedings are specif-
ically exempted from the provisions of the Administrative Procedure
Act.22
Contrary to the rule as to the representation proceeding, the
APA's provisions do apply to the unfair labor practice proceeding.23
within the scope of this note, but generally speaking, it is a disputed fact
which, if found for the objecting party, would cause the election to be in-
validated. Conduct which falls into the following categories invalidates an
election: (1) conduct amounting to an unfair labor practice and (2) conduct
not amounting to an unfair labor practice but which creates an atmosphere
calculated to prevent "a free and untrammeled choice by the employees."
General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 126 (1948). See also Bok, The Regulation
of Campaign Tactics in Representation Elections under the National Labor
Relations Act, 78 HARv. L. REV. 38 (1964); Note, National Labor Relations Act
Elections: Post Election Objections, 38 TEMP. L.Q. 288 (1965).
18 29 C.F.R. § 102.69(c) (1968). In this connection, "the Board has uni-
formly refused to direct a hearing on such objections unless the objecting
party supplies specific evidence of conduct which prima facie would warrant
setting the election aside. [Citations omitted]. The speculative possibility
advanced by the Employer that evidence to support its allegations might
transpire at a hearing is insufficient to warrant the delay in these proceedings
which would arise from directing such a hearing." Orleans Afg. Co., 120
N.L.R.B. 630, 631-32 (1958).
19 National Labor Relations Act § 9(c), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1964). See
Inland Empire Council v. Millis, 325 U.S. 697, 710 (1945) (due process satis-
fied if a hearing held before final order becomes effective); NLRB v. J.R.
Simplot Co., 322 F.2d 170 (9th Cir. 1963); 148 CCH LAB. L. RF. 146 (1968)
(32d Annual Report of NLRB).
20 NLRB v. J.R. Simplot Co., 322 F.2d 170 (9th Cir. 1963).
21 E.g., NLRB v. O.K. Van Storage, Inc., 297 F.2d 74 (5th Cir. 1961).
22 Administrative Procedure Act § 5, 60 Stat. 239 (1946). This section
applies, according to the provisions thereof, "[iln every case of adjudication
required by statute to be determined on the record after opportunity for an
agency hearing, except to the extent that there is involved ... (6) the cer-
tification of employee representatives. .. "
23 Labor Management Relations Act § 6, 61 Stat. 140 (1947): "The Board
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The NLRA and the Board's rules appear to contemplate a hearing as
a matter of course in every unfair labor practice case.24 Nevertheless,
beginning in 1965, the Board allowed summary judgments in unfair
labor practice cases where there had been a hearing in the underlying
representation proceeding. 25 Finally, in E-Z Davies, the Board de-
clared that it was extending the "substantial and material issues" test
to the unfair labor practice case,20 and under this test granted sum-
mary judgment in the unfair labor practice proceeding even though
+here had been no hearing in the underlying representation proceed-
ing. The prior proceeding in E-Z Davies consisted only of the Regional
Director's ex parte decision, upheld by the Board on appeal. The
Board, in extending the test to the unfair practice proceeding, stated
that it made no sense to apply a rule limiting hearings in one pro-
ceeding if the employer could obtain an evidentiary hearing on the
same objection in the other.27
When the Board's first case in which summary judgment was em-
ployed reached the Fourth Circuit, the use of the procedure in the
unfair labor practice proceeding was greeted with equivocation.28
Recently, however, the courts have approved the use of summary
judgments in unfair labor practice proceedings where there has been
shall have authority from time to time to make, amend, and rescind, in the
manner prescribed by the Administrative Procedure Act, such rules and regu-
lations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act."
24 E.g., 29 C.F.R. § 102.15 (1968) (emphasis added): "After a charge has
been filed ... [and informal methods for reconciling the grievance have
failed] the regional director... shall issue and cause to be served upon all
the other parties a formal complaint in the name of the Board stating the
unfair labor practices and containing a notice of hearing before a trial ex-
aminer.. . ." It is also stated in National Labor Relations Act § 10(b), 29
U.S.C. § 160(b) (1964), that "[w]henever it is charged that any person has
engaged in or is engaging in any such unfair labor practice, the Board, or any
agent or agency designated by the Board... shall have power to issue... a
complaint stating the charges ... and containing a notice of hearing .... "
25 KVP Sutherland Paper Co., 143 N.L.R.B. 834 (1965). See also Collin
Aitman Corp., 160 N.L.R.B. 1750 (1966) (motion for summary judgment di-
rectly to Board bypassing trial examiner stage of hearing); Macomb Pottery
Co, 157 N.L.R.B. 1616 (1966); Draper Corp., 152 N.L.R.B. 520 (1965) (summary
judgments granted by trial examiners).
20 E-Z Davies Chevrolet, 161 N.L.R.B. 1380, 1383 (1966).
27 Id. at 1383.
28 NLRB v. KVP Sutherland Paper Co., 356 F.2d 671, 673-74 (4th Cir.
1966), denying enforcement of 143 N.L.R.B. 834 (1965). "Perhaps even more
to the point, the National Labor Relations Act (let alone due process!) squarely
provides for hearings [quoting 29 U.S.C. 160(b) (1964)] . . . ." Id. at 673.
"[But] [w]e are by no means unimpressed by [the Board's] argument that
litigation must have an end somewhere and that this case has already pro-
duced great delay." Id. at 674.
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a representation hearing.29 The Ninth Circuit goes beyond this trend
by approving the application of summary judgment to an unfair labor
practice proceeding where there was no hearing for the first time in
E-Z Davies.
Arguments for Summary Judgment
The reasons for the Board's use of summary judgment in repre-
sentation-refusal-to-bargain cases such as E-Z Davies are compelling.
First, the Board has felt the need to deal with all cases as quickly as
possible to relieve the pressure of a mounting workload.30 Since 1958
that workload has increased dramatically. In the 10 year period prior
to 1958, the NLRB handled a yearly average of approximately 5,000
unfair labor practice charges.31 The number of charges jumped to
12,000 in 1958.82 In fiscal 1967, the number of unfair labor practice
charges exceeded 30,000, 83 and it is estimated that the NLRB will be
confronted with 50,000 charges a year by 1972.34 Neither the Board's
manpower nor its appropriations have been sufficient to keep abreast
of the burgeoning workload.3 5  One solution has been to innovate
time-saving remedies and procedures.
3 6
Secondly, the Board's view of its function in representation cases
has changed in the past 10 years. In the 1959 congressional hearings
that considered amendments to the National Labor Relations Act,
the Board urged Congress to pass provisions allowing the Board to
delegate responsibility for representation matters to NLRB Regional
Directors.8  Congress amended the NLRA as the Board requested 8
and the Board delegated authority over representation proceedings
29 E.g., NLRB v. Aerovox Corp., 390 F.2d 653 (4th Cir. 1968); NLRB v.
Puritan Sportswear Corp., 385 F.2d 142 (3d Cir. 1967); Neuhoff Bros. Inc., v.
NLRB, 362 F.2d 611, 613 (5th Cir. 1966); see NLRB v. Macomb Pottery, 376
F.2d 450, 452 (7th Cir. 1967) (no hearing requested in representation case).
80 See authority cited notes 31-36 infra.
31 Rothman, In Search of Improving the Administration of the National
Labor Relations Act, 13 LAB. L.J. 777, 778 (1962).
32 Id.
33 148 CCH LAB. L. REP. 1 (1968) (32d Annual Report of the NLRB).
34 Rothman, In Search of Improving the Administration of the National
Labor Relations Act, 13 LAB. L.J. 777, 779 (1962).
35 See Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representation Elec-
tions under the National Labor Relations Act, 78 HARV. L. R-y. 38, 60-62 (1964);
Rothman, In Search of Improving the Administration of the National Labor
Relations Act, 13 LAB. L.J. 777, 779-80 (1962).
30 McCulloch, Past, Present and Future Remedies Under Section 8(a) (5)
of the NLRA, 19 LAB. L.J. 131, 141 (1968).
87 S. REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. at 31 (1959).
38 Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (Landrum-
Griffin Act) § 701(b), 73 Stat. 542.
1064 [Vol. 20
to the Regional Directors in 1961.31 Since 1961, the Board has tended
to view representation elections and unfair labor practices as separate
matters. Regional Directors exercise jurisdiction over representation
cases; trial examiners exercise jurisdiction over unfair labor practice
matters; and the Board itself sits in review of the Regional Directors
and the trial examiners as an appellate body.40 In the view of the
courts and the statutes, decisions as to certification of bargaining
representatives in a representation proceeding are not "final" but
merely dispositive of challenges to the conduct of the election which
do not result in refusal-to-bargain unfair labor practice charges.41
The Board, on the other hand, has come to look upon a decision in a
representation case as the final adjudication of issues relating to the
certification of bargaining representatives. 42
From this "finality" of the representation judgment, there arises
an argument analogous to the doctrine of res judicata. The argu-
ment first appeared in Board decisions in unfair labor practice cases
where there had been a hearing in the prior representation case.43
The argument advanced is that issues which were or could have been
litigated in the underlying representation proceeding cannot be re-
litigated in the unfair labor practice proceeding.44 In E-Z Davies,
the extent of the prior "litigation" of the issue of the validity of the
representation election consisted of the NLRB Regional Director's ex
parte decision and its affirmation by the Board on appeal.45
However, the Board's most telling argument does not appear to
be in the physical pressure of the caseload alone, nor in the notions of
res judicata implicit in the Board's position taken after representation
jurisdiction was delegated. But taking these two developments into
account, use of summary judgment has its greatest value and justifi-
39 Hearings before the Subcomm. on National Labor Relations Board of
the House Comm. on Education and Labor on the Administration of the Labor
Management Relations Act by the NLRB, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 17(1961) (testimony of NLRB Executive Secretary Field) [hereinafter cited as
Pucinski Hearings].
40 See id. pt. 2, at 1331 (testimony of NLRB Chairman McCulloch). See
also Farmer, Problems of Organization and Administration of the National
Labor Relations Board, 29 GEo. WAsu. L. REV. 353, 365 (1960).
41 See National Labor Relations Act §§ 9(c) (3), 10(f), 29 U.S.C. §§ 159
(c) (3), 160(f) (1964). See also Eastern Greyhound Lines v. Fusco, 310 F.2d
632, 634-35 (6th Cir. 1962).
42 Address by Jay S. Siegel, 14th Annual Institute on Labor Law of the
Southwestern Legal Foundation, Nov. 2, 1967, in LABOR RELATios YEM~Moox-
1967, at 231, 235 (1968).
43 E.g., KVP Sutherland Paper Co., 143 N.L.R.B. 834 (1965).
44 E.g., Union Bros., 162 N.L.R.B. No. 140 (Feb. 8, 1967) (could have been
litigated in prior proceeding); Brush-Moore Newspapers, Inc., 161 N.L.R.B.
1620, 1622 (1966).
45 See NLRB v. E-Z Davies Chevrolet, 395 F.2d 191, 192 (9th Cir. 1968).
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cation as a logical safeguard to an employee's right of collective bar-
gaining in the face of the "elusive problem of delay" often existing in
the aftermath of a representation election. 6
The National Labor Relations Act declares that it is the policy
of the United States to encourage the collective bargaining rela-
tionship.47  "[I]t is implicit in the Act that questions preliminary
to the establishment of the bargaining relationship be expeditiously
resolved, with litigious questions reserved for the proceedings for re-
view or enforcement of Board orders.148 Protracted litigation over
the validity of an election may ultimately scuttle effective union
organization despite an eventual finding by the courts that the elec-
tion was a valid manifestation of the employees' wishes, and that the
employer had a duty to bargain.4 9 Short of actual destruction of the
organizing effort, "[a] remedy granted more than 2 years after the
event will bear little relation to the human situation which gave
rise to the need for Governmental intervention." 0
A full hearing as a matter of right in an unfair labor practice
proceeding following a representation case raises opportunities to de-
lay an adverse ruling and thereby to obviate its effect.51 By refusing
to bargain, an employer can rely on obtaining a relatively inexpensive
and lengthy review of his objections in the unfair practice case, dur-
ing which time there can be no effective unionization of his business.
In the period between the election and the final order of the Board in
the unfair practice case, employee turnover and employee disaffec-
tion resulting from a union's apparent inability to produce promised
results, might secure for the employer what he is unable to win at
the polls in the representation election. Delay, cheaply bought by
a refusal to bargain, can have devastating results for the union.5 2
46 McCulloch, Past, Present and Future Remedies Under Section 8(a) (5)
of the NLRA, 19 LAB. L.J. 131, 141 (1968).
47 National Labor Relations Act § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1964): "It is
declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of cer-
tain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate and
eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred by encouraging the prac-
tice and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by
workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of
representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the
terms and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection."
48 NLRB v. O.K. Van Storage, Inc., 297 F.2d 74, 76 (2d Cir. 1963).
49 See McCulloch, Past, Present and Future Remedies Under Section
8(a) (5) of the NLRA, 19 LAB. L.J. 131, 136 (1968).
50 Id. at 133, quoting S. Doc. No. 81, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1960).
I1 See NLRB v. Joclin Mfg. Co., 314 F.2d 627, 632 (2d Cir. 1963).
52 See Pucinski Hearings, supra note 39, at 155-57 (Pollack testimony);
McCulloch, Past, Present and Future Remedies Under Section 8(a) (5) of the
NLRA, 19 LAB. L.J. 131, 136 (1968). See generally Farmer, Problems of Organ-
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By using summary judgment in representation-refusal-to-bargain
unfair labor practice proceedings, the Board confines the issue of
certification of bargaining representatives to the Regional Directors
and allows the employer only limited review in the representation
proceeding itself. Thus, summary judgment effectively eliminates
most of the repetitive unfair labor practice proceeding and leaves
only that part of the proceeding necessary to make Board orders final
for the purposes of review or enforcement by a court of appeals.
In addition to eliminating redundant proceedings, summary judg-
ment expedites access to review and enforcement of Board orders.
This result should afford the employer who has meritorious objections
to a Regional Director's certification of a union more speedy relief
from Board orders to bargain. At the same time, the expense of court
of appeals litigation should further limit the advantages of delay ac-
cruing to the employer who refuses to bargain merely to buy time.
Due Process and Summary Judgment
The benefits derived from the use of summary judgment may be
desirable in the eyes of a beleagured NLRB and an anxious union.
However, there remains the question of whether there is a denial of
administrative due process in allowing summary judgment based
upon the ex parte determination of an NLRB Regional Director.
Professor Davis, in his treatise on Administrative Law,53 states that
whether an evidentiary hearing of the kind demanded by E-Z Davies
is necessary in an administrative proceeding depends upon whether
or not there are adjudicative facts at issue.54  "Adjudicative facts
usually answer the questions of who did what, where, when, how,
why, [and] with what motive or intent; adjudicative facts are
roughly the kind of facts that go to a jury .... ,", Davis feels that
an evidentiary hearing is neither necessary nor desirable when there
are no "adjudicative facts," but merely "legislative facts."5 6 "Legis-
lative facts do not usually concern the immediate parties but are gen-
eral facts which help the tribunal decide questions of law and policy
and discretion. '57 According to Davis, adjudicative facts are the
kind of facts which ordinarily ought not to be determined without
giving the parties a chance to know and to meet any evidence that
may be unfavorable to them in an open hearing.58 The courts have
ization and Administration of the National Labor Relations Board, 29 GEo.
WASH. L. REv. 353, 363-64 (1960).
53 K. DAviS, 1 A inrsTAT.Ev LAw TRETIsE § 7.02 (1958).
54 Id.
55 Id. § 7.02, at 413.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Id.
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echoed this theme.
However, the courts have also stated that "there is no require-
ment, constitutional or otherwise, that there be a hearing in the
absence of substantial and material issues crucial to determination of
whether NLRB election results are to be accepted for purposes of
ceritification."59 There is nothing in the Administrative Procedure
Act, the National Labor Relations Act, or the Board rules, which
specifically precludes the use of summary proceedings in unfair labor
practice cases.60 The language of these acts and rules, however,
appears to contemplate a hearing in each case.61 In the face of the
apparently contradicting language of the statutes and rules, the
Board justifies its opting for summary judgment on the ground that
the Constitution "protects procedural regularity, not as an end in it-
self, but as a means of defending substantive interests.162 A strict
interpretation of statutory language must be weighed against the
right of employees to enjoy collective bargaining.
Due Process and E-Z Davies
With this analysis and background in mind, the question that
remains is whether E-Z Davies' rights were fairly weighed by the
NLRB. The Board provided E-Z Davies the opportunity to object to
election conduct and to have its objections tested in an evidentiary
hearing.6 3 However, to gain such a hearing, E-Z Davies had to con-
vince the Regional Director that its objections raised issues in the
nature of "who did what, where, when, how, why, [and] with what
motive or intent,"64 which were crucial-that is to say, substantial
and material-to a determination of whether or not the election was
fair under Board policy as determined by Board precedent.65  When
E-Z Davies failed to convince the Regional Director that it had raised
factual issues which could be resolved only after a hearing, the com-
pany had the opportunity to have the decision of the Regional Di-
59 NLRB v. Bata Shoe Co., 377 F.2d 821, 826 (4th Cir. 1964).
60 For applicable National Labor Relations Act provisions and Board
Rules, see note 3 supra. See also Administrative Procedure Act § 7, 5 U.S.C.
556 (d) (1964), as amended, (Supp. I, 1967): 'Except as otherwise provided
by statute .... A party is entitled to present his case or defense by oral
or documentary evidence, to submit rebuttal evidence, and to conduct such
cross-examination as may be required for a full and true disclosure of the
facts."
61 5 U.S.C. 556(d) (1964), as amended, (Supp. II, 1967).
62 As in other Board cases, the Board in E-Z Davies Chevrolet, 161
N.L.R.B. 1380, 1384 (1966), used language similar to that found in Fay v. Doud,
172 F.2d 720, 725 (2d Cir. 1949) (Hand, J.).
63 See text accompanying note 7 supra.
64 K. DAVIS, 1 Anivn'sTRATIvE LAW TREATISE § 7.02, at 413 (1958).
65 See text accompanying note 17 supra.
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rector reviewed by the Board before the representation proceeding
was closed and certification became "final."66 In the following un-
fair labor practice proceeding, E-Z Davies was again afforded review
of the Regional Director's decision through argument to the Board on
the order to show cause why summary judgment should not be
granted. Had E-Z Davies developed or discovered evidence which
was not available at the time of the representation proceeding, and
which met the "substantial and material issues" test, a full hearing in
the unfair labor practice proceeding would have been granted.
In coming to his conclusion in the representation proceeding, the
Regional Director not only made no ex parte determination of crucial
adjudicative facts, he made no determination of any adjudicative facts.
The essential fact alleged by the employer was that the union's ob-
server at the representation election was not an employee of com-
pany, but rather was a union officer. This "fact" was disputed
by no one.6 7 Therefore, there was no factual issue to be determined
by the Regional Director, much less a factual issue of such crucial
importance that the validity of the election hung in the balance until
its resolution.
The decision made by the Regional Director appears to have been
based upon what Professor Davis terms "legislative" facts, or gen-
eralized facts which help decide questions of policy, law and dis-
cretion.68 Two such facts were determined in overruling E-Z Davies'
objections without a hearing. First, the Regional Director decided
that there was no conflict in the factual allegations of the parties that
gave rise to a material factual dispute which could be resolved only
after an evidentiary hearing. Secondly, he decided that as a matter of
Board precedent a non-employee, union official could act as an ob-
server at a representation election without prejudicing the fairness of
that election. E-Z Davies appealed the Regional Director's legal con-
clusions to the Board and the Board affirmed 69 the Director, thus
affirming the certification of the union as the salesmen's bargaining
representative and bringing the representation proceeding to a close.
Conclusion
Dissatisfied with the results of the representation case, E-Z Davies
refused to bargain with the representative its employees had selected.
Having failed to convince the Board in the representation proceeding
that it had a meritorious objection to the election, E-Z Davies was
properly denied "another bite of the same apple" in the subsequent
66 29 C.F.R. § 102.67 (1968); notes 8 and 9 supra.
67 NLRB v. E-Z Davies Chevrolet, 395 F.2d 191 (9th Cir. 1968).
68 K. DAviS, 1 A vNsTRATIV LAW TREATISE § 7.02 (1958).
69 395 F.2d 191 (9th Cir. 1968).
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unfair labor practice case. To allow an evidentiary hearing in the un-
fair labor practice proceeding on the same issues alleged and disposed
of in the representation proceeding serves no legitimate due process
end. It merely encourages disrespect for the determinations made in
the representation proceeding, and destroys any efficacy in the rep-
resentation case rule that there will be no evidentiary hearings on
allegations which do not raise material factual considerations. A
repetitious hearing in an unfair labor practice case to consider a stale
issue can serve no purpose but to encourage frivolous, dilatory liti-
gation productive of delays which dilute the rights of collective bar-
gaining guaranteed to labor by the National Labor Relations Act.
The Ninth Circuit has wisely agreed with the National Labor Re-
lations Board that summary judgment and the "substantial and ma-
terial factual issues" test are useful and legitimate tools for the Board
to apply to the representation-unfair labor practice proceeding.7 0 The
court has approved the procedural innovations as furthering the
policy of the United States to secure industrial peace by protecting
the right of workers to bargain collectively.
It remains to be seen whether the Ninth Circuit will extend its
approval of summary proceedings to other quasi-judicial agencies.
However, the E-Z Davies decision does seem to suggest that where
substantive rights may be prejudiced by reading the Administrative
Piocedure Act and other legislation to give parties an absolute right
70 Construing three Ninth Circuit cases, it is seen first that in T.R.
Simplot the court upheld the "substantial and material issues" test as it
applied to the representation proceeding by quoting from O.K. Van Storage,
Inc.: "'The opportunity for protracted delay of certification of the results of
representation elections which would exist in the absence of reasonable con-
ditions to the allowance of a hearing on objections is apparent. An objecting
party who fails to satisfy such conditions has no cause for complaint .... "
NLRB v. J.R. Simplot Co., 322 F.2d 170, 172 (9th Cir. 1963), quoting NLRB v.
O.K. Van Storage, Inc., 297 F.2d 74, 76 (5th Cir. 1961). The Ninth Circuit
continued, stating: "The same may be said with even greater force with
respect to exceptions to a report on objections .... In reviewing orders up-
holding elections or declaring them invalid the proper test is whether the
Board's order constituted abuse of discretion." NLRB v. J.R. Simplot Co.,
322 F.2d 170, 172 (9th Cir. 1963). In E-Z Davies the court endorsed as "ade-
quate" the Board's reasoning in extending the test referred to in Simplot
beyond the representation case to the unfair labor practice case. NLRB v.
E-Z Davies Chevrolet, 395 F.2d 191, 192 (9th Cir. 1968). Finally, in recently
decided Sonoco the court flatly stated: "We merely hold that the 'substantial
and material factual issues' test ... provides a proper and appropriate
standard for judging whether a party challenging the results of a represen-
tation election should have the benefit of a hearing. It is against that stand-
ard that we judge the correctness of the Board's failure to grant petitioner
the hearing it sought." Sonoco Prods. Co. v. NLRB, 399 F.2d 835, 839 (9th
Cir. 1968).
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to be heard, the Ninth Circuit will be receptive to argument that no
such absolute right exists.
J.L.A.
B. Illegal Boycotts-NLRB v. Salem Building Trades
Council, 388 F.2d 987 (9th Cir. 1968).
Rather than hold that an ingenious union attorney had located a
loophole in section 8(b) (4) (B) of the National Labor Relations Act,1
the Ninth Circuit, without writing an opinion, affirmed the NLRB
decision in NLRB v. Salem Building Trades Council.2
The Salem Building Trades Council was involved in a dispute
with Reimann Construction Company, a non-union employer. North-
ridge Industries engaged Reimann to build a motel, and Candelaria
Investment Company engaged it to build an ice cream parlor. The
Union did not interfere with the construction and both buildings were
completed without difficulty, each opening for business in the fall of
1965. The Union then boycotted both businesses, its signs proclaiming:
"THIS BUILDING BUILT UNDER SUB-STANDARD WAGES AND
CONDITIONS BY REIMANN CONSTRUCTION COMPANY." 3 Rei-
mann filed a complaint with the NLRB against the Union charging
that the Union's boycotts violated section 8 (b) (4) (B) of the National
Labor Relations Act. Section 8 (b) provides in pertinent part:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or
its agents ...
(ii) to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce
or in industry affecting commerce, where . . . an object thereof is
(B) forcing or requiring any person ... to cease doing business with
any other person. . . .4
The Union responded that it could not force Northridge and Can-
delaria to cease doing business with Reimann because they were no
longer dealing with Reimann, the contractual ties between the parties
having disappeared with the completion of the buildings. The
apparent goal of the Union was to coerce Northridge and Candelaria
to refrain from engaging Reimann in the future and the Union's boy-
cotts were intended to carry out this purpose.5
1 Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (Landrum-Griffin
Amendment) § 704(a), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (1964), amending National Labor
Relations Act § 8(b) (4), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (1964), amending 49 Stat. 452
(1935).
2 388 F.2d 987 (9th Cir. 1968).
3 Salem Bldg. Trades Council, 163 N.L.R.B. No. 9, at 4 (Feb 20, 1967).
4 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1964) (emphasis added).
5 Salem Bldg. Trades Council, 163 N.L.R.B. No. 9, at 6 (Feb. 20, 1967).
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The NLRB assumed the Union's contention-that it could not be
enjoined because there was no existing business relationship between
Northridge or Candelaria and Reimann-was true and still found the
boycotts to be illegal. It held that an existing business relationship
was not "an indispensable prerequisite for finding a violation ....
Although some attempts to influence the activities of neutral em-
ployers could be found permissible under the statute, the NLRB
concluded that the Union activity complained of constituted imper-
nissible conduct under the section. This result was explained as
follows:
To hold . . . that upon the completion of one contract the neutral
employers, by virtue of their past business dealings, become fair
game for picketing pressures by a union seeking, as here, to enforce
its blacklist of the primary employer, would be to apply that Section
in a manner inconsistent with both its terms and the basic policy con-
siderations underlying its enactment.7
The Ninth Circuit, in affirming the NLRB decision, effectuated
the congressional intent of protecting neutrals8 although the wording
of the statute, when applied to the facts of Salem, would seem to de-
mand a contrary result. The precedent upon which the NLRB re-
lied,9 and which the court quietly adopted, provides, at best, a fragile
foundation for the determination reached. It seems to contradict the
statutory requirement of "forcing . . . any person ... to cease doing
business with any other person. . ."10 to hold, as the NLRB and the
Ninth Circuit did, that a course of dealing need no longer exist be-
tween the primary and secondary employers in order to find that the
activity of the union against the secondary employer violates the
section.
This note will be limited to a discussion of this resolution of the
"threshold issue"" of Salem. It is submitted at the outset that
Salem marks a departure from mere statutory interpretation as evi-
denced by prior court interpretations of section 8 (b) (4) (B). In its de-
6 Id. at 5.
7 Id. at 6.
8 National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 624-27 (1967);
NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 692 (1951);
National Maritime Union v. NLRB, 346 F.2d 411, 417-19 (D.C. Cir. 1965);
Pressmen's Local 46 v. NLRB, 322 F.2d 405, 410 (D.C. Cir. 1963); NLRB v.
United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners, 184 F.2d 60, 64 (10th Cir. 1950), cert.
denied, 341 U.S. 947 (1951); 1 NATIONAL LABOR RELATiONS BOARD, LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMEENT REPORTING AND DISCLosURE ACT OF 1959,
at 80 (1959).
9 Salem Bldg. Trades Council, 163 N.L.R.B. No. 9, at 5 nn.3-5 (Feb.
20, 1967).
10 National Labor Relations Act § 8(b) (4) (B), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (B)
(1964).
11 Salem Bldg. Trades Council, 163 N.L.R.B. No. 9, at 6 (Feb. 20, 1967).
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sire to carry out the congressional intention of protecting neutrals,
the Ninth Circuit, in adopting the NLRB decision, broadened the
meaning of "cease doing business" to include "refrain from doing busi-
ness." Is this a valid interpretation?
Section 8(b) (4) (B)-History and Underlying Congressional Intent
Section 8 (b) (4) (B) is the latest embodiment of the congressional
intention of "shielding inoffending employers and others from pres-
sures in controversies not their own."'1 2  This intent of protecting
neutrals was originally expressed in section 8(b) (4) (A) of the Taft-
Hartley Act.13 However, the Taft-Hartley provision, which was di-
rected against secondary boycotts, 14 was not entirely effective and
Congress passed the Landrum-Griffin Act 15 in 1959 to plug the loop-
holes.16 Section 8(b) (4) (A) was redrafted and designated section 8(b)
(4) (B). This transformation left the phrase "cease doing business"
unaltered. An examination of the previous drafts of both the Taft-
Hartley and Landrum-Griffin Acts reveals that Congress did not con-
sider any other word combination as an expression of its intent.17
This seems to indicate that the situation dealt with in Salem-lack of
an existing business relationship-was overlooked. This is not an
unreasonable oversight. It is difficult to envision a union picketing
neutrals who are not doing business with the primary employer to
cause them to refrain from dealing with him. Yet this is precisely
what happened in Salem. Had such a case arisen before deliber-
ations took place on the Landrum-Griffin Act, Congress would un-
doubtedly have substituted "cease or refrain from doing business" in
12 NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 692
(1951).
13 National Labor Relations Act § 8(b) (4), 61 Stat. 141 (1947).
14 See 1 NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
LABOR-MANAGEMMNT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 363, 428, 547 (1947); 2 id. at 1106,
1339, 1341, 1366, 1455.
15 Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act § 704(a), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(b)(4) (1964).
16 See National Woodwork Mfg. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 632-34
(1967); NLRB v. Servette, Inc., 377 U.S. 46, 51-52 (1964); Cohen, Observations
on Two Aspects of Secondary Boycott Cases: Assertion of Jurisdiction by the
NLRB and Common Situs Picketing, 15 J. PuB. L. 220, 223 (1966); Comment,
The Landrum-Griffin Amendments: Labor's Use of the Secondary Boycott,
45 CORNELL L.Q. 724, 726-50 (1960); Comment, Labor Law-Secondary Boy-
cotts-The Effect of the 1959 Amendments to the National Labor Relations
Act, 44 ORE. L. REv. 301, 302-15 (1965).
17 See 1 NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 7, 42, 113, 169, 240 (1947); 1
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGE-
MENT REPORTING AND DIsCLOsuRE ACT OF 1959, at 142, 255, 328, 595-96, 681, 751,
929 (1959).
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place of "cease doing business."' 8  Such a substitution would have
made it easy for the NLRB to bring the neutral employers in Salem
within the section's protection and the case would have never reached
the Ninth Circuit. Before this problem arose though, both section
8 (b) (4) (B) and its predecessor were by their terms sufficiently gen-
eral to permit the NLRB and the courts to carry out the broad con-
gressional intention of protecting neutrals where no secondary boy-
cott existed.
Broadening Interpretation of Section 8(b) (4) (B)
and Its Predecessor to Protect Neutrals
Section 8(b) (4) (A) was originally aimed at outlawing the second-
ary boycott.19 In a typical secondary boycott, a union which has a la-
bor dispute with Employer A (the primary employer) applies pressure
against B (the neutral or secondary employer) in order to force B to
cease doing business with A. Although the legislative history is
filled with references to secondary boycotts, 20 Congress chose not to
use the term in the section. The courts have construed this as an
indication of congressional intention not to limit enforcement of the
section to "secondary boycotts" in the strict sense of the term.21
It was not long before the courts were faced with union activity
which did not conform to a technical "secondary boycott." In 195022
the Second Circuit found a violation of the section for activity which
was later named a "tertiary boycott. '23 A tertiary boycott differs
from a secondary boycott in that the netural employer who is sub-
18 Congress used the phrase cease or refrain in subsection (e), which sec-
tion 704(b) of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act added to
National Labor Relations Act § 8, 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1964). This seems to
indicate that Congress would not have left the word cease to represent the
phrase cease or refrain if it had considered the possibility of a union boy-
cotting persons who were not presently doing business with the primary
employer.
19 See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
20 See NATIONAL LABOR RELATIoNs BOARD, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AcT, 1947 (1947).
21 "The mere fact that the language of this Section [8 (b) (4)3 compre-
hends the familiar patterns of a secondary boycott in the customary sense
does not inexorably dictate the conclusion that it excludes all variations from
those patterns." National Maritime Union v. NLRB, 346 F.2d 411, 417 (D.C.
Cir. 1965). "Congress did not intend to confine the effect of § 8(b)(4) to a
strict or precise definition of the term 'secondary boycott'... ." National
Maritime Union v. NLRB, 342 F.2d 538, 543 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
835 (1965).
22 Local 501, IBEW v. NLRB, 181 F.2d 34 (2d Cir.), affd, 341 U.S. 694
(1950).
23 Local 450, Operating Eng'rs v. Elliott, 256 F.2d 630, 637 (5th Cir.
1958).
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jected to union pressure has no direct business relationship with the
primary employer. Instead he is doing business with a second
neutral employer who in turn has a business relationship with the
primary employer. The union's objective is to force the first neutral
to cease dealing with the other neutral who in turn will be forced to
cease dealing with the primary employer.24
In 1964, section 8 (b) (4) (B) was found applicable where a union
attempted to compel a secondary employer to limit its business deal-
ings with the primary employer. The Seventh Circuit held that
"[1] ess than a total cessation of an existing business relationship
is within the meaning of 'cease doing business' in § 8 (b) (4) (B) .,25
A year later the scope of the section was broadened further by
applying it where the union had a dispute with a rival union rather
than with a primary employer.26 In response to the rival union's
boycott of a ship on which members of the first union were em-
ployed, the first union boycotted a second ship causing a work
stoppage which not only affected members of the rival union but
also caused the shipowners, stevedoring companies and other neutral
employers to cease dealing with each other. Had the section been
limited to secondary boycotts, the lack of a dispute between the union
and a primary employer would have been fatal to the neutral em-
ployers' case.
Salem would seem merely to be another step in the expansion of
the interpretation of section 8(b) (4) (B). Yet is it? Does "cease doing
business" encompass "refrain from doing business?" Webster's
Third International Dictionary defines "cease" as "discontinue,"
"terminate," or "halt. ' 27 "Refrain" is defined as "forbear," "avoid,"
or "abstain.12 8 A recent judicial formulation comparing "cease" and
"refrain" is illuminating:
Unquestionably, the word "cease" implies that the objective referred
to has been in existence and is to be stopped. It does not follow,
however, that the word "refrain" must be limited to future events
exclusively. The concept may be of "refraining" from doing, in the
future, that which one is presently doing, but said concept is little
24 See NLRB v. Plumbers Local 157, 369 F.2d 388 (7th Cir. 1966); NLRB
v. Carpenters Local 11, 242 F.2d 932 (6th Cir. 1957); NLRB v. Carpenters
Local 1976, 241 F.2d 147 (9th Cir. 1957), afi'd, 357 U.S. 93 (1958); NLRB v.
Teamsters Local 182, 219 F.2d 394 (2d Cir. 1955); Longshoremen Local 1224,
160 N.L.R.B. 732 (1966); Plumbers Local 370, 157 N.L.R.B. 20 (1966).
25 NLRB v. Milk Wagon Drivers Local 753, 335 F.2d 326, 328 (7th Cir.
1964); accord, Retail Clerks Local 1017, 249 F.2d 591, 595 (9th Cir. 1957).
20 National Maritime Union v. NLRB, 346 F.2d 411 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Na-
tional Maritime Union v. NLRB, 342 F.2d 538 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 835 (1965). See also NLRB v. Washington-Oregon Shingle Weavers
Council, 211 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1954).
27 WEBSTER's THIRD NEw INTERNATIONAL DIcTIoNARY 358 (3d ed. 1961).
28 Id. at 1909.
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different from that of "ceasing" to do, in the future, that which one
is presently doing. As so used, the words "ceased" and "refrain"
may be synonymous .... However, there are also contexts in which
they are not synonymous . . . (e.g., "refraining" from doing some-
thing in the future which is not presently being done).29
As there was no present business relationship between the neutrals
and the primary employer in Salem, the example utilized by the
court seems directly applicable, and "cease doing business" could not,
under the facts, include "refrain from doing business."
Although the terms "cease" and "refrain" may not always be
synonymous there is some authority, by analogy, for the judicial
construction of section 8(b) (4) (B) adopted in Salem. The NLRB cited
NLRB v. Servette, Inc.30 In Servette the Supreme Court held that
section 8 (b) (4) (B) protected a distributor even though the section uses
the phrase "producer, processor, or manufacturer," which, if read liter-
ally, would not include a distributor. The Court relied upon a history
of previous decisions which preceded the 1959 congressional deliber-
ations on the Landrum-Griffin Act and which construed the term
"producer" broadly so that it encompassed distributors. It reasoned
that Congress was aware of the Court's construction of the term and
the congressional failure to alter the wording of the phrase "producer,
processor, or manufacturer" when the section was being redrafted
constituted an acceptance of that interpretation. 31  This would be
analogous to the NLRB's interpretation of "cease doing business" in
Salem except that there is no prior congressional recognition of the
fact that "cease" and "refrain" are synonymous in all their appli-
cations.
Effect of Salem on Section 8(b) (4) (B)
By endorsing the NLRB's opinion without comment, the Ninth
Circuit provided no clues to indicate how broadly Salem should be
29 Hoffman v. Teamsters Local 38, 230 F. Supp. 684, 691 (N.D. Cal. 1962)
(emphasis by the court) (petition for a temporary injunction). But the Ninth
Circuit rejected this distinction between "cease" and "refrain" and found, after
consideration of the legislative history of § 8(e) of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, 29 U.S.C. 158(e), that the terms were commonly treated as syn-
onymous. NLRB v. Teamsters Local 38, 338 F.2d 23, 27 (9th Cir. 1964) (peti-
tion for enforcement of NLRB's order). It should be noted, however, that the
particular circumstances which led to this conclusion-the unexplained omis-
sion of the phrase "or refrain" from one clause of § 8(e) after its inclusion in
the original amendment-nowhere appear in the legislative history of § 8(b)
(4) (B). It is submitted that the omission in § 8(e) was the result of oversight
and not the result of a feeling that "cease" would carry the load of "cease or
refrain." Otherwise the use of "refrain" in the section's prior clause would
be redundant.
80 377 U.S. 46 (1964).
s1 Id. at 55-56.
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construed.3 2 If the holding is construed narrowly, which seems un-
likely, a neutral, if not presently dealing with the primary employer,
would be required to show a past business relationship with the em-
ployer to merit the protection of Section 8 (b) (4) (B). As a result, one
class of neutrals, persons who had never dealt with, and who were
not dealing with the primary employer, would be unprotected.
The alternative, and better construction, would extend the sec-
tion's protection to all neutrals. This broad construction would recog-
nize that the most logical basis for determining that the section has
been violated is not the existence or non-existence of a business re-
lationship, but rather the concept of neutrality. If a party is foreign
to the primary dispute, in other words neutral, he should be protected
from becoming "enmeshed in controversies not his own."133 The dis-
pute should be confined to the primary parties and not enlarged by
dragging in uninterested persons. This application of Salem would
best carry out the underlying congressional intention of protecting
neutrals and is undoubtedly the path that will be followed by the
NLRB and the courts in the future.34 But whatever course is fol-
lowed, Salem is one more step toward the complete protection of
neutrals.
Conclusion
Section 8(b) (4) (B) is an expression of the congressional intention
of protecting neutrals by confining labor disputes to the primary
parties. Originally aimed at secondary boycotts, the NLRB and the
courts have been able to extend its protection to neutrals although
they were not victims of a secondary boycott. This result would have
been unlikely had Congress lacked the foresight to word the section
in general terms, not mentioning "secondary boycott." The Ninth
Circuit, in Salem, followed the trend and extended protection to
neutrals although no secondary boycott existed. It is submitted that
this result is commendable. However, to reach it the court adopted
the NLRB's determination that "cease" encompasses "refrain." This
is more than mere interpretation. Should not Congress have been
left the chore of amending section 8(b) (4) (B) to read "cease or re-
32 Salem has been cited in two later NLRB decisions. Twin City Car-
penters Council, 167 N.L.R.B. No. 151, at 17 (Oct. 24, 1967); Glaziers Local 558,
165 N.L.R.B. No. 27, at 6 (June 6, 1967). Neither case is directly in point al-
though the first uses the NLRB's determination of the "threshold issue" as
an example.
33 McLeod v. Paper Cutters Local 119, 220 F. Supp. 133, 136 (S.D.N.Y.
1963).
34 AMIcAN BAR AssocrAToN, 1967 PROCEMaNGS ON LABOR RELATIONs
LAW 188, supports the conclusion that Salem extends the protection of section
8 (b) (4) to all neutrals.
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frain from doing business?" The Supreme Court has said:
Courts have sometimes exercised a high degree of ingenuity in
the effort to find justification for wrenching from the words of a
statute a meaning which literally they did not bear in order to escape
consequences thought to be absurd or to entail great hardship....
But in such case the remedy lies with the law making authority, and
not with the courts.35
Yet, if Salem is to be followed, and the congressional intention
underlying section 8(b) (4) (B) dictates that it must be,36 it should be
construed broadly. The key to the section's protection should be
neutrality-not the existence of a business relationship.
I.S.B.
C. Employers' Free Speech: Prediction Opinion Test-
NLRB v. TRW-Semiconductors, Inc., 385
F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1967).
In July of 1964, a union composed of machinists and aerospace
workers1 held a representation election of production and maintenance
workers employed by TRW-Semiconductors, Inc.2 The union lost the
election and filed a complaint with the NLRBs alleging that the
company was guilty of unfair labor practices under section 8 (a) (1) of
the National Labor Relations Act which provides: "(a) It shall be an
unfair labor practice for an employer-(1) to interfere with, restrain,
or coerce employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in section
7."4 Section 7 states: "Employees shall have the right to self-organ-
ization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collec-
tively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage
in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining
or other mutual aid or protection. . ...5
The trial examiner appointed by the NLRB found that between
the time the union had filed a petition with the NLRB for a represen-
tation election and the date of the election, the company had distrib-
uted 47 notices in the form of bulletins, letters, posters, placards
35 Crooks v. Harrelson, 282 U.S. 55, 60 (1930).
36 See text accompanying notes 32-34 supra.
1 International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-
CIO. NLRB v. TRW-Semiconductors, Inc., 385 F.2d 753, 755 (9th Cir. 1967).
2 This company, located in southern California, is a subsidiary of TRW,
Inc. The company employs approximately 700 employees, mainly female. Id.
3 TRW Semiconductors, Inc., 159 N.L.R.B. 415 (1966).
4 Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 8(a) (1), 61
Stat. 140 (1947).
5 § 7, 61 Stat. 140 (1947).
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and leaflets to the employees designed to inform them of the com-
pany's opposition to the union.6 The trial examiner and the Board
concluded that certain actions of the company constituted violations
of section 8 (a) (1).
Specifically, the trial examiner found that the company had vio-
lated the Act in a pre-election speech given by the company's vice
president and general manager in which the employees were warned:
"No one can assume that if an outside union gets into our company
that all the fine things we now enjoy would automatically be con-
tinued. If we should be forced into negotiation with the union, the
company would have to begin from scratch and bargain hard to pro-
tect our competitive position.' 7 The trial examiner, following NLRB
v. Marsh Supermarkets, Inc.8 which held statements made by an
employer that employees would lose existing benefits were violations
of section 8(a) (1) of the Act, found this statement an unlawful
interference with the rights of the employees under the Act. The
trial examiner noted that in the Marsh case the employer had stated
that employees "would lose" existing benefits but that in the present
case the employer had not made a positive declaration that they
"would lose" these benefits. The trial examiner stated: "Neverthe-
less, [the] presumption can hardly be considered warranted that
* . . respondent's workers possessed the capacity to make semantic
distinctions worthy of some Byzantine logomach .... [The] lan-
guage was clearly calculated to convey a message that their current
fringe benefits would certainly be jeopardized .... -9 The trial
examiner found that these statements constituted threats of economic
loss and reprisal designed to "trigger responses bottomed on fear" in
the violation of the Act.10
The trial examiner found violations of the Act in statements
that "[employees] may find themselves out of a job because they
said something or did something that displeases the union bosses."'"
The trial examiner noted that the employer's message, although "not
couched in specifically coercive terms, reflects a threat bottomed upon
* . . serious misrepresentations." 2  As such, it possessed a "coercive
thrust meriting statutory interdiction."'3
6 TRW Semiconductors, Inc., 159 N.L.R.B. 415, 417 (1966) (Trial Ex-
aminer's Report).
7 Id. at 421.
8 327 F.2d 109 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 944 (1964).
9 TRW Semiconductors, Inc., 159 N.L.R.B. 415, 426 (1966) (Trial Exami-
ner's Report).
10 Id.
11 Id. at 421.
12 Id. at 424.
18 Id. at 425.
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The trial examiner also found violations of the Act in the com-
pany's statements and notices linking the union with physical vio-
lence. In the company newspaper the employer published photo-
graphs of strikes by other unions with headings and stories designed
to associate the union involved in this case with the depicted violence.
Notices were posted by the company on the day of the election which
read, "Threatened Violence Will Not Be Tolerated." These statements
were found by the trial examiner to "contain misrepresentations of
facts and conclusions, calculated to link the alleged threats of violence
to the union and thus buttress [the company's] campaign to asso-
ciate unions with violence.' 14
The Board adopted the findings of the trial examiner and di-
rected that a cease and desist from unfair labor practices order be
issued against the employer.'8  The Board, in NLRB. v. TRW-Semi-
conductors, Inc.,"0 petitioned the Ninth Circuit for enforcement of its
cease and desist order. The Ninth Circuit, Judge Duniway delivering
the opinion, reversed the Board and held that the company's state-
ments were not in violation of the NLRA.17
NLRA and Free Speech
The provisions of section 8 (a) (1) of the NLRA forbidding employ-
ers from interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the
exercise of their rights under the Act necessarily places restrictions
upon the freedom of expression of employers. The issue may be
raised whether these restrictions placed upon the employer constitute
an abridgment of freedom of speech guaranteed by the first amend-
ment to the Constitution.
In dealing with any problem involving free speech, it is essential
to recognize that the first amendment rights are not viewed by the
courts as absolute, but rather are viewed as rights which may be
qualified by surrounding circumstances.' 8 In labor relations matters,
individual rights of freedom of expression must be weighed against
the public interest in providing workers with the right freely to
elect or reject collective bargaining.' 9 While the value of collective
14 NLRB v. TRW-Semiconductors, Inc., 385 F.2d 753, 757 (9th Cir. 1967).
'5 TRW Semiconductors, Inc., 159 N.L.R.B. 415 (1966).
16 385 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1967).
17 Id.
18 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 508 (1951), where the Court
stated: "Nothing is more certain in modern society than the principle that
there are no absolutes, that a name, a phrase, a standard has meaning only
when associated with the considerations which gave birth to the nomencla-
ture." See Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966); Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
19 NLRB v. Herman Wilson Lumber Co., 355 F.2d 426 (8th Cir. 1966)
(dissenting opinion).
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bargaining continues to be the subject of conflicting opinions, the
position of the federal government has not been one of neutrality.
20
The passage of the Wagner Act 2 ' in 1935 guaranteed workers the
right to organize and assert collective strength. In balancing the
rights of employees against the rights of employers it has been asserted
that "[n] either the Act nor the Constitution tolerates an abridg-
ment of the right of an employer to communicate with his employees
so long as he does not attempt to infringe the rights of his employees
as guaranteed by the Act.
'22
The courts have concluded that the constitutional guarantee of
free speech entitled the employer to express his views and opinions
upon matters of interest to his employees and himself and that the
provisions of section 8(a) (1) do not forbid him from making such
expressions. 23 However, where the employer's statements go beyond
the mere expression of opinion and constitute an attempt to coerce
or intimidate employees by threats of reprisal, such expressions are
not protected by the first amendment or by the Act.24 The courts
have held that employers may not use the free speech provisions of
the first amendment as a shield from behind which they may coerce
and intimidate employees.25 As one author has pointed out in this
regard, there is "no constitutional right of coercion. '26
The issue, therefore, is not whether section 8 (a) (1) constitutes an
unconstitutional limitation upon freedom of speech, but rather
20 E.g., Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor Management Relations Act,
1947, 61 HAnv. L. REV. 1, 2 (1947); Summers, Politics, Policy Making, and the
NLRB, 6 SYRACUSE L. REV. 93, 96-98 (1954).
21 National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act), 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68
(1964).
22 NLLRB v. Bangor Plastics, Inc., 392 F.2d 772, 775 (6th Cir. 1967) (em-
phasis added).
23 E.g., NLRB v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 314 U.S. 469, 477 (1941);
NLRB v. Bangor Plastics, Inc., 392 F.2d 772 (6th Cir. 1967); NLRB v. TRW-
Semiconductors, Inc., 385 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1967); NLRB v. Clark Bros. Co.,
163 F.2d 373, 376 (2d Cir. 1947); Edward G. Budd Mfg. Co. v. NqLRB, 142 F.2d
922, 926 (3d Cir. 1944). The Ninth Circuit, shortly after the adoption of the
Act, stated that had the Act prohibited such expression of opinion, it would
have been unconstitutional. NLRB v. Union Pac. Stages, Inc., 99 F.2d 153, 178
(9th Cir. 1938).
24 See section 8(c), quoted in text accompanying note 45 infra, which
specifically provides that an expression which does not constitute a threat or
reprisal is not a violation of section 8(a)(1). For some cases dealing with
the question whether employer statements went beyond the mere expres-
sion of opinion, see note 70 infra.
25 NLRB v. La Salle Steel Co., 178 F.2d 829, 835 (7th Cir. 1949), cert.
denied, 339 U.S. 963 (1950); NLRB v. Glenn L. Martin-Nebraska Co., 141 F.2d
371, 373 (8th Cir. 1944).
26 Note, The Coercive Character of Employer Speech: Context and
Setting, 43 GEO. L.J. 405, 414 (1955).
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whether a particular statement is within the protection of the first
amendment and the provisions of the Act. As the Ninth Circuit
stated in NLRB v. TRW-Seciconductors, Inc.,27 the test employed to
determine whether the challenged statement violates the Act is, as
set forth in section 8(c) of the Act, whether the material "contains a
threat of force or reprisal or promise of benefit by the employer. '28
The conflict of opinion between the NLRB and the Ninth Circuit
in TRW-Semiconductors appears to result from a difference in their
respective methods of determining whether the statements in contro-
versy constituted a prohibited "threat." A primary purpose of this
note is to focus attention upon this difference.
28
Wagner Act
Prior to the enactment of the Wagner Act in 1935, neither statute
nor common law restricted what an employer might lawfully say to
his employees in the course of a labor dispute.30 The Wagner Act,
by bringing labor relations matters under the jurisdiction of the
NLRB, provided a variety of restrictions against management's inter-
ference with the employees' choice to adopt or to reject collective
bargaining. Section 8(a) (1) encompassed restrictions upon threats or
coercive statements made to employees to induce them to reject union-
ization.31 At the time of the enactment of section 8(a) (1), there
appears to have been little concern as to the effect this legislation
might have on the employer's free speech. This is evidenced by the
fact that an amendment to the Act expressly protecting the employer's
right to freedom of speech was rejected by Congress. 2
The NLRB's first five years of administration of the Wagner Act
has prompted the observation that the Board at that time was "obliv-
ious to the proposition that an employer might have a constitutional
27 385 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1967).
28 Id. at 759.
29 For discussion of some of the issues raised, see Bok, The Regulation
of Campaign Tactics in Representation Elections under The National Labor
Relations Act, 78 HARV. L. Rnv. 38 (1964); Christensen, Free Speech, Propa-
ganda and the National Labor Relations Act, 38 N.Y.U.L. REv. 243 (1963); Cox,
Some Aspects of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 (2 pts.), 61 HARV.
L. REv. 1, 274 (1947); Kirby, Constitutional Issues in Labor Law: A Sympo-
sium, 63 Nw. U.L. Rnv. 1 (1968); Pokempner, Employer Free Speech under the
National Labor Relations Act, 25 MD. L. Rnv. 111 (1965); Note, Section 8(c):
The Necessity For a Balancing of Interests, 56 GEO. L.J. 630 (1968); 1968 DUKE
L.J. 401; 2 GA. L. REv. 126 (1968).
30 Christensen, supra note 29, at 255.
31 See text of section 8 (a) (1) accompanying note 4 supra.
82 H.R. REP. No. 1371, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1935); Christensen, supra
note 29, at 255.
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right to express opposition to unionization of his employees.""
Management was considered to have no legitimate interest in whether
its employees selected collective bargaining representatives.3 4 The
employer was required to maintain strict neutrality on the theory
that his superior economic position "carrie[d] such weight and in-
fluence that his words [might] be coercive when they would not
be so if the relation of master and servant did not exist. ' 35
Although the NLRB adopted the proposition that an employer
must maintain strict neutrality during the selection of collective
bargaining representatives, the circuit courts were split on this issue.86
In contrast to the Board's position on strict neutrality, the Ninth Cir-
cuit in 1938 stated: "It is difficult to think that Congress intended
to forbid an employer from expressing a general opinion that an
employee would find it more to his advantage not to belong to a
union. Had Congress attempted so to do it would be in violation of
the First Amendment. ' 37 The Sixth Circuit made a similar objection
to the Board's position.38
From Virginia Electric to Taft-Hartley (1941-47)
In 1941, the United States Supreme Court expressly rejected the
notion that employers were obliged under the NLRA to maintain
strict neutrality. In NLRB v. Virginia Electric and Power Co.,3 9 the
Supreme Court stated: "The employer .. is ... free ... to take
any side it may choose ....
The Court in Virginia Electric, however, did not reject the strict
neutrality doctrine without qualification. By its statement that
"[i]f the total activities of an employer restrain or coerce his em-
ployees in their free choice, then those employees are entitled to the
protection of the Act,"41 the Court provided guidelines for deter-
mining whether the employer had violated the Act. Under the total-
ity of activities test set forth in' Virginia Electric, the right of the
employer to express his opinion regarding unionization was pro-
tected so long as his total conduct did not restrain or coerce his em-
33 Christensen, supra note 29, at 255.
34 Id.
35 NLRB v. Falk Corp., 102 F.2d 383, 389 (7th Cir. 1939), rev'd on other
grounds, 308 U.S. 453 (1940).
36 For cases supporting and rejecting the neutrality requirement in the
early years of the NLRB, see Note, Limitations upon an Employer's Right of
Noncoercive Speech, 38 VA. L. REv. 1037, 1039 nn.8-12 (1952).
37 NLRB v. Union Pac. Stages, Inc., 99 F.2d 153, 178 (9th Cir. 1938).
8 Midland Steel Prods. Co. v. NLRB, 113 F.2d 800, 804 (6th Cir. 1940).
39 314 U.S. 469 (1941).
40 Id. at 477.
41 Id.
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ployees. Speech, therefore, which did not by its own terms contain
any threats or promises in violation of the Act, might be prohibited
if the total activities of the employer, including the speech, restrained
the rights of employees under the Act.42
The Board, in the wake of the Virginia Electric decision rejecting
the strict neutrality doctrine, proceeded to push the totality of activi-
ties test to unacceptable extremes. For example, in some cases the
Board found that innocuous statements by employers were violations
of the Act because of some unrelated past activity of the employer. 43
This practice generated concern among legislative leaders, and this
concern led to the enactment in 1947 of section 8(c) 44 of the National
Labor Relations Act. Section 8(c) provides:
The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the dissemina-
tion thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual form,
shall not constitute or be evidence of a unfair labor practice under
any of the provisions of this Act, if such expression contains no threat
of reprisal or force or promise of benefit.45
Thus, section 8(c), in effect, incorporated the position of the Supreme
Court in Virginia Electric into the Act by providing that the em-
ployer's expression of opinion did not constitute an unfair labor prac-
tice if such expression did not contain a prohibited threat.46
While the legislative history of section 8 (c) clearly suggests a con-
cern for protecting the employer's constitutionally guaranteed rights
of free expression, neither the Act itself nor the legislative record
provides precise guidelines which enable the Board and the courts
to apply section 8 (c) to specific cases.4 7 Although the legislative rec-
ord indicates a dissatisfaction with the Board's broad application of
the totality of activities test,48 there is nothing to suggest that Con-
gress intended the other extreme, that no consideration be given to
42 Id.
43 See, e.g., Peter J. Schweitzer, Inc. v. NLRB, 144 F.2d 520 (D.C. Cir.
1944); Edward G. Budd Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 142 F.2d 922, 928 (3d Cir. 1944).
44 "The practice which the Board has had in the past of using speeches
and publications of employers concerning labor organizations and collective
bargaining arrangements as evidence, no matter how irrelevant or immaterial,
that some later act of the employer had an illegal purpose gave rise to the
necessity for this change in the law." Congressional Comments, U.S. CoDE
CONGRESSIONAL SERVICE, 80th Congress, 1st Sess. 1151 (1947); see S. REP. No.
105, 80th Congress, 1st Sess. 23-24 (1947).
45 Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) 61 Stat. 136, 142
(1947), amending National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act), 49 Stat. 449
(1935).
46 314 U.S. at 477.
47 E.g., Linn v. Plant Guard Workers Local 114, 383 U.S. 53 (1966).
The Supreme Court stated in that case: "Our task is rendered more difficult
by the failure of the Congress to furnish precise guidance in either the lan-
guage of the Act or its legislative history." Id. at 58.
48 See note 44 supra.
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any expression not coercive on its face.49 Congress rejected a House
of Representatives version of the proposed amendment which would
have required that a prohibited statement "by its own terms" con-
tains a threat of force or economic reprisal.50 Congress, however, also
rejected a Senate version which provided that statements must under
"all the circumstances" contain no threat.51 The express language of
section 8(c), therefore, provides no guidance in determining whether
the challenged statements should be examined in light of surrounding
circumstances or whether they should be read standing alone.
From the adoption of the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947 to the early
1960's, the totality of activities doctrine was given limited, if any,
application. 52  The Board, particularly under the Eisenhower Ad-
ministration, tended to examine challenged statements in isolation
from other expressions or activities of the employer.53  Under the
Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, however, the Board began to
emphasize the context of the employer's statements. 54 As will be
discussed, a number of the circuit courts have followed the Board's
position and have both revived and re-affirmed the totality of circum-
stances test set forth in Virginia Electric.5 5
Prediction, Opinion, or Threat?
In their efforts to develop fairly consistent methods for deter-
mining whether a particular statement by an employer falls within
the protection of section 8(c) and the first amendment to the Consti-
tution, or is prohibited by the Act, a number of the courts have dis-
tinguished between statements which are merely the opinion or pre-
diction of the employer of the "dire economic consequences" 56 which
may accompany unionization, and statements which constitute pro-
49 See Cox, supra note 29, at 17; Koretz, Employer Interference with
Union Organization Versus Employer Free Speech, 24 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 339,
411 (1960).
50 H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 33 (1947).
51 S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 23-24 (1947). The fact that
Congress otherwise adopted the proposed House version of the amendments
lends some support to the contention that they did not intend to restrict the
analysis to the bare statement. Further, the silence of the amendment on this
issue might suggest an intention to leave the law as it had previously been
applied-giving consideration to the surrounding circumstances.
52 E.g., Christensen, supra note 29, at 258; see Note, The Coercive Char-
acter of Employer Speech: Context and Setting, 43 GEo. L.J. 405, 411-16
(1955).
53 Christensen, supra note 29, at 258.
54 Cf. TRW Semiconductors, Inc., 159 N.L.R.B. 415 (1966); Christensen,
supra note 29, at 258.
55 See note 70 infra.
56 Texas Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 336 F.2d 128, 130 (5th Cir. 1964).
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hibited threats under the Act.57  In reversing the findings of the
trial examiner and the Board in TRW-Semiconductors, the Ninth Cir-
cuit utilized the "prediction-opinion" test:
The literature and the speech, insofar as violence and strikes are
concerned, are but predictions of what the union might or would do.
As such, we think they fall squarely within the protection of section
8(c), even though they might well produce, in the minds of employees,
fears of violence.5 8
The court further stated: "The mere fact that campaign propaganda
may induce fear-and be intended to produce fear-does not deprive
it of the protection of section 8(c)."59 In contrast, the trial examiner
found that the employer's statements contained a prohibited threat
because, although generally couched in non-coercive language, the
statements were coercive and unlawful because they were delivered
in a context reasonably intended and calculated to produce fear of
loss of economic benefits in the event of unionization. 60
The conflict between the Ninth Circuit's conclusions, which were
reached by using the "prediction-opinion" analysis, and the Board's
conclusions, which were reached by using the contextual or totality
of activities approach, results in part from an assumption underlying
the Ninth Circuit's "prediction-opinion" analysis. This assumption is
that individual phrases of an employer's speech may be "wrenched
from the context of the entire speech, from the setting in which the
speech is given, and from the entire course of conduct which the
speech may illustrate and serve to advance."61 The weakness in this
assumption is that statements made in the.course of labor relations,
like statements in any other context, take their meaning from the
circumstances in which they are enmeshed. As Judge Sobeloff of the
Fourth Circuit stated in a section 8 (a) (1) case:
57 E.g., Jervis Corp. v. NLRB, 387 F.2d 107, 112 (6th Cir. 1967) (threat);
NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 339 F.2d 498, 501 (5th Cir. 1964) (prediction);
NLRB v. Transport Clearings, Inc., 311 F.2d 519, 523-24 (5th Cir. 1962)
(economic prophecy).
58 NLRB v. TRW-Semiconductors, Inc., 385 F.2d 753, 759 (9th Cir. 1967);
see Don the Beachcomber v. NLRB, 390 F.2d 344, 345 (9th Cir. 1968) (predic-
tion).
59 NLRB v. TRW-Semiconductors, Inc., 385 F.2d 753, 760 (9th: Cir. 1967).
60 TRW Semiconductors, Inc., 159 N.L.R.B. 415, 423-24 (1966) (Trial
Examiner's Report); accord, Wausau Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 377 F.2d 369, 372
(7th Cir. 1967): "While we do not doubt that [the employer] proceeded care-
fully in attempting to limit his communications to his employees to the legally
permissible, his words must be judged by their likely import to his em-
ployees." NLRB v. Herman Wilson Lumber Co., 355 F.2d 426, 432 (8th Cir.
1966) (dissenting opinion): "While [the employer] may have been careful to
couch his language in terms of prediction, or statement of legal position
... they could be construed to threaten inevitable loss of jobs following
Union certification."
61 Christensen, supra note 29, at 273.
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[S]omething said in one context may be entirely permissible while
in a different situation the same statement may be forbidden and
even render the speaker subject to punishment. Thus, in Justice
Holmes's classic example, a false cry of fire, conceivably tolerable in
some places, will not be protected if shouted in a crowded theatre.
62
Likewise, a statement made in terms of opinion by an employer in
the midst of a heated anti-union campaign must be interpreted as
part of the total setting and not as an isolated statement.
In theory, the "prediction-opinion" test protects the right of the
employer merely to point out the adverse consequences which might
result from unionization. It thereby permits him to contribute "in-
formation" which is clearly pertinent to the decision-making of the
employee. In practice, however, this analysis and classification may
permit the knowledgeable employer to evade the prohibitions of the
Act by carefully couching his statements in non-coercive "opinions."63
In an age of fairly sophisticated relations between labor and
management, experienced management personnel are generally care-
ful to avoid overt violations of section a (a) (1) through blatant state-
ments.64 Yet, as the Fifth Circuit has stated: "Veiled threats, as
well as direct threats, of economic reprisal against union activity
have been held violative of -[section] 8 (a) (1)."65 The employer who
is careful to phrase his threats of economic reprisal in terms of
opinion or prediction may be able to make statements designed to
coerce and induce fear in the minds of his employees and still re-
main within the protection of section 8(c).66 The net result may be
a subversion of the labor policy embodied in the NLRA under the
guise of protection of free speech.67 Furthermore, if the position
62 Kayser-Roth Hosiery v. NLRB, 388 F.2d 979, 981 (4th Cir. 1968)
(special concurrence); accord, Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919);
see Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 470 (1966).
63 Professor Bok points out that the classification in practice has given
"hostile employers great leeway to indulge in dire predictions in order to
dissuade the employees from supporting the union." Bok, The Regulation
of Campaign Tactics in Representation Elections under the National Labor
Relation Act, 78 HARV. L. REV. 38, 75 (1964).
64 One article has suggested that the increased number of cases in which
employer speech has been sustained as prophecy may be due partly to the
fact that employers have learned to bring their statements within these rules.
Wollett & Rower, Employer Speech and Related Issues, 16 OnIo ST. L.J. 380,
386 (1955).
65 NLRB v. Borden Co., 392 F.2d 412, '414 n.4 (5th Cir. 1968); accord,
NLRB v. Drivers Local 886, 235 F.2d 105, 108 (10th Cir. 1956).
66 E.g., NLRB v. TRW-Semiconductors, Inc., 385 F.2d 753, 759, 760 (9th
Cir. 1967).
67 A House of Representatives Minority Report expressed a similar
concern at the time of the enactment of section 8(c): "[T]he laudable pur-
pose of protecting free speech cloaks an evil design to encourage unfair labor
practices by employers." H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 84-85 (1947).
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taken by the Ninth Circuit in TRW-Semiconductors, that "[s]ection
8(c) does not protect only those views, arguments or opinions that
are correct, nor does it forbid them because they may be demonstrably
incorrect,"68 is maintained, then employers may have great leeway
in "predicting" the consequences of unionization.
While the Ninth Circuit in TRW-Semiconductors, has reaffirmed
its adherence69 to the "prediction-opinion" test, a majority of the
circuit courts in their recent decisions have placed emphasis upon
the need to examine employer statements in the context of the totality
of activities surrounding the statement.7 0 As the Fourth Circuit
stated: "The fact that ... statements considered alone and out of
the context in which they were made may not amount to threats of
economic reprisal is of no moment because their effect must be con-
sidered in toto. ' 71
The conflict between those courts that have continued to limit
their examination of employer statements to the "prediction-opinion"
analysis and those courts that have emphasized the necessity of exam-
ining the totality of activities is clearly illustrated by the conflicting
statements of the Fifth and Fourth Circuits. The Fifth Circuit, which
adheres to the "prediction-opinion" test,72 stated: "[W] e agree with
the Trial Examiner that 'since no part [of the speech] violates the
right of free speech, it would be difficult to find that the sum of all its
parts constitutes threats or promises to employees, or is coercive
respecting their rights to support or not support the Union'."7 3 In
contrast, the Fourth Circuit stated: "Even if we assume that each of
the key statements ... considered separately would be lawful .. it
68 385 F.2d 753, 760 (9th Cir. 1967).
69 In a subsequent case, Don the Beachcomber v. NLRB, 390 F.2d 344
(9th Cir. 1968), the court followed its analysis in TRW-Semiconductors.
70 E.g., Serv-Air, Inc. v. NLRB, 395 F.2d 557, 561 (10th Cir. 1968); NLRB
v. Kolmar Laboratories, Inc., 387 F.2d 833, 836 (7th Cir. 1967); Dayco Corp. v.
NLRB, 382 F.2d 577, 579 (6th Cir. 1967); J.P. Stevens & Co., v. NLRB, 380 F.2d
292, 302-03 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1005 (1967); Wausau Steel Corp.
v. NLRB, 377 F.2d 369, 372 (7th Cir. 1967); Corrie Corp. v. NLRB, 375 F.2d 149,
153 (4th Cir. 1967); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. NLRB, 371 F.2d 573, 580
(6th Cir. 1967); NLRB v. McCormick Concrete Co., 371 F.2d 149, 152 (4th Cir.
1967); Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. NLRB, 365 F.2d 898, 910 (D.C. Cir.
1966); Teamsters Local 728 v. NLRB, 364 F.2d 682, 684 (D.C. Cir. 1966); NLRB
v Herman Wilson Lumber Co., 355 F.2d 426, 429 (8th Cir. 1966); Daniel Constr.
Co. v. NLRB, 341 F.2d 805, 811 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 831 (1965).
71 NLRB v. McCormick Concrete Co., 371 F.2d 149, 152 (4th Cir. 1967).
72 See, e.g., Southwire Co. v. NLRB, 383 F.2d 235, 241 (5th Cir. 1967).
For a critical analysis of the Fifth Circuit's holding in the Southwire case, see
Note, Section 8(c): The Necessity For A Balancing of Interests, 56 GEo. L.J.
630 (1968).
73 Russell-Newman Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 370 F.2d 980, 982 (5th Cir. 1966),
quoting Russell-Newman Mfg. Co., 153 N.L.R.B. 1312, 1319 (1965).
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still does not follow that we must accept the proposition pressed
upon us by the company. [It] may have accurately stated an
accepted rule of mathematics [that the whole cannot be greater
than the sum of its parts], but words and speech are not governed
entirely by mechanical mathematical concepts."7 4
Conclusions
In determining whether a particular pronouncement has a rea-
sonable75 or likely 76 tendency to intimidate employees in their exer-
cise of rights under the NLRA, a growing number of the circuit
courts77 have acknowledged the necessity of looking beyond the for-
mal phrasing of a statement and examining the "circumstances in
which the language is used and ... the ears to which it is directed."78
The Ninth Circuit, however, in reversing the findings of the NLRB in
TRW-Semiconductors, held that statements couched in terms of pre-
diction were protected under the Act even though they might induce
and be intended to induce fear in the employees.7 9
The "prediction-opinion" test used by the Ninth Circuit in revers-
ing the Board is technically correct, that is to say, employers are free
to make statements or express opinions in labor relations matters
which do not constitute threats or promises in violation of the Act.80
The Ninth Circuit, however, clearly is not within the majority view
in determining whether a statement is a prohibited threat or a pro-
tected opinion when it rigidly adheres to a system of classification
which holds a statement protected simply because the employer has
been careful to phrase it in permissible terms where that statement
is, in fact, likely to induce, and intended to induce, fear in the em-
ployees.
The totality of activities analysis and the "prediction-opinion"
test are not mutually exclusive approaches; indeed, the totality of
activities test as first presented by the Supreme Court in Virginia
Electric impliedly contained the "prediction-opinion" test.81 The dif-
ficulty arises when a court attempts to utilize the prediction-opinion
74 Daniel Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 341 F.2d 805, 811 (4th Cir), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 831 (1965).
75 Dayco Corp. v. NLRB, 382 F.2d 577, 580 (6th Cir. 1967); Corrie Corp.
v. NLRB, 375 F.2d 149, 153 (4th Cir. 1967).
76 NLRB v. Kolmar Laboratories, Inc., 387 F.2d 833, 837 (7th Cir. 1967).
77 Cases cited note 70 supra.
78 NLRB v. Golub Corp., 388 F.2d 921, 929 (2d Cir. 1967) (dissenting
opinion).
79 385 F.2d 753, 760 (9th Cir. 1967).
80 See section 8 (c) in text accompanying note 45 supra.
81 In Virginia Electric, the Court recognized the right of the employer
to express an opinion which did not restrain or coerce the employees in the
totality of circumstances. See NLRB v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 314 U.S.
469,477 (1941).
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test without examining the entire surroundings of the expression.
Words and expressions necessarily take their meaning from the sur-
roundings in which they are found, and the surroundings may trans-
form a statement couched in terms of prediction into a real threat.
In TRW Semiconductors, the trial examiner found that the em-
ployer's non-coercive terms were transformed by the surrounding
circumstances into coercive expressions meriting statutory interdic-
tion.8 2 Section 10 (e)83 of the Act provides that the findings of the
Board are to be sustained where supported by substantial evidence, 4
even though the court might reach an opposite conclusion in a de
novo proceeding.8 5 The Ninth Circuit's obligation in TRW-Semicon-
ductors was simply to determine whether there was substantial evi-
dence to support the Board's conclusions. Under the totality of activi-
ties doctrine, the court was not obliged to limit its examination to
the mere formal phraseology of the employer's statements to deter-
mine if the Board's finding of a violation was supported by sub-
stantial evidence. Had the court, as the trial examiner clearly did,
utilized the totality of activities doctrine, it might easily have found
that there was substantial evidence to show that the employer's pre-
dictions and opinions actually constituted prohibited threats.
In order to effectuate the policy of the NLRA and to provide
freedom from coercion and intimidation in the decision of employees
to elect or reject collective representations, it is essential that the
Ninth Circuit utilize the Virginia Electric totality of activities doc-
trine when it examines Board holdings to determine whether they are
supported by substantial evidence. Congress has entrusted to the
particular expertise of the NLRB the burden of protecting the rights
of both employers and employees under the National Labor Relations
Act. The determination of the NLRB that an expression of an em-
ployer has violated the provisions of the Act should not be reversed
merely because the employer's threat has been couched in terms of
opinion or prediction. Rather than attempting to fit employer's state-
ments into pre-conceived categories which may ignore the more subtle
implications of the expression in the context in which they have
been delivered, what is called for is a careful case-by-case deter-
muination of whether the challenged material can reasonably be con-
strued to carry a prohibited threat to induce employees to reject the
union.
S. M. M.
82 TRW Semiconductors, Inc., 159 N.L.R.B. 415, 423-24 (1966) (Trial Ex-
aminer's Report).
88 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1964).
84 Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 487-88 (1951).
85 NLRB v. Safeway Steel Scaffolds Co., 383 F.2d 273, 279 (5th Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 390 U.S. 955 (1968).
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D. Evidentiary Use of Prior Unfair Labor Practices-
NLRB v. Macmillan Ring-Free Oil Co.,
394 F.2d 26 (9th Cir. 1968).
Section 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act is a statute of
limitations which bars the National Labor Relations Board from
bringing an action against a party charged with an unfair labor prac-
tice under the Act if the charge is based on unfair labor practices
occurring six months prior to the filing of the charge with the NLRB. 1
Section 10(b) does not mention how much weight, if any, may be
given to evidence of unfair labor practices occurring prior to the
limitations period in a later NLRB proceeding. But the section has
been construed to include a restriction on the admissibility of such
evidence as well as a time limitation for the filing of an unfair labor
practice charge.2
There has been little discussion in the cases as to the weight to
be given evidence of prior unfair labor practices when a party is sub-
sequently charged with violating the same unfair labor practice pro-
vision of the National Labor Relations Act. This problem is par-
ticularly acute where the NLRB can find only insubstantial evidence
during the limitations period of such a violation. Two recent federal
cases have dealt specifically with this question. Local 1424, Inter-
national Association of Machinists [IAM] v. NLRB 3 concerned two
such situations and, by dictum, recognized a third situation in which
a different effect should be given the statute of limitations because
of differences in the quantum of evidence found within the limitations
period. The recent decision of NLRB v. MacMillan Ring-Free Oil
Company,4 by expressly ruling on this third situation, completes
1 National Labor Relations Act, § 10(b), 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1964)
[hereinafter cited as NLRA]: "[N]o complaint shall issue based upon any
unfair labor practice occurring more than six months prior to the filing of the
charge with the Board ...
2 Prior to 1960, it was the established rule m NLRB decisions and
federal cases that section 10(b) was only a statute of limitations, and not
rule of evidence. See, e.g., NLRB v. Clausen, 188 F.2d 439, 443 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, b42 U.S. 868 (1951); Paramount Cap Mfg. Co., 119 N.L.R.B. 785,
787 (1957), enforced, 260 F.2d 109, 112 (8th Cir. 1958); In re Axelson Mfg. Co.,
88 N.L.R.B. 761, 766 (1950).
The Supreme Court of the United States rejected this construction in
Local 1424, 1AM v. NLRB stating, "we think that permitting resort to the
principie that Section 10(b) is not a rule of evidence, in order to convert
what is otherwise legal into something illegal, would vitiate the policies
underlying that section." Local 1424, AM v. NLRB, 362 U.S. 411, 419 (1960).
The Ninth Circuit's decision in MacMillan reaffirms the position that section
10(b) is both a rule of evidence and a statute of limitations. NLRB v. Mac-
Millan Ring-Free Oil Co., 394 F.2d 26, 33 (9th Cir. 1968).
a 362 U.S. 411 (1960).
4 394 F.2d 26 (9th Cir. 1968).
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the application of section 10(b) to the various evidentiary situations
possible.
In Local 1424, 1AM, the Supreme Court recognized three differ-
ent situations in considering the extent to which events antedating
the six-month limitations period could be used as evidence to deter-
mine whether conduct within the limitations period constituted an
unfair labor practice.5 In its approach to the question of section 10
(b)'s application to the admissibility of evidence originating before
the six-month period, the Supreme Court said:
It is doubtless true that § 10 (b) does not prevent all use of evidence
relating to events transpiring more than six months before the filing
and service of an unfair labor practice charge. However, in apply-
ing rules of evidence as to the admissibility of past events, due regard
for the purposes of § 10 (b) requires that two different kinds of situa-
tions be distinguished. The first is one where occurrences within the
six-month limitations period in and of themselves may constitute, as
a substantive matter, unfair labor practices. There, earlier events
may be utilized to shed light on the true character of matters oc-
curring within the limitations period; and for that purpose § 10 (b)
ordinarily does not bar such evidentiary use of anterior events. The
second situation is that where conduct occurring within the limita-
tions period can be charged to be an unfair labor practice only through
reliance on an earlier unfair labor practice. There the use of the
earlier unfair labor practice is not merely "evidentiary," since it does
not simply lay bare a putative current unfair labor practice. Rather,
it serves to cloak with illegality that which was otherwise lawful.6
In other words, if the NLRB finds substantial evidence of an
unfair labor practice within the limitations period, the Board may
consider evidence of prior unfair labor practices to determine whether
an unfair labor practice occurred within the limitations period.7 In
the second situation mentioned by the Supreme Court,8 where no
evidence of an unfair labor practice is found within the limitations
5 Local 1424, IAM v. NLRB, 362 U.S. 411, 416-17, 421 (1960).
6 Id. at 416-17.
7 The holding in the first situation is well supported by NLRB and
lower federal court decisions. See, e.g., NLRB v. Murray Ohio Mfg. Co., 326
F.2d 509, 511 (6th Cir.), enforced, 328 F.2d 613 (1964); NLRB v. General Shoe
Corp., 192 F.2d 504, 507 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 904 (1951); NLRB v.
Clausen, 188 F.2d 439, 443 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 868 (1951); Armco
Drainage & Metal Prods., Inc., 106 N.L.R.B. 725, 730 (1953); Sharples Chem.,
Inc., 100 N.L.R.B. 20, 30 (1952); In re Axelson Mfg. Co., 88 N.L.R.B. 761, 765-
66 (1950).
s The holding in the second situation is also well established by NLRB
and lower federal court decisions. See, e.g., NLRB v. Textile Mach. Works,
214 F.2d 929, 933-34 (3d Cir. 1954); NLRB v. Childs Co., 195 F.2d 617, 621
(2d Cir. 1952); Bowens Prods. Corp., 113 N.L.R.B. 731, 732 (1955); In re
Knickerbocker Mfg. Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 1195, 1196 (1954); Bonwit Teller, Inc., 96
N.L.R.B. 608, 610 (1951); Greenville Cotton Oil Co., 92 N.L.R.B. 1033, 1034
(1950), affd, 197 F.2d 451, 453 (5th Cir. 1952); In re Goodall Co., 86 N.L.R.B.
814, 844 (1949).
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period, the NLRB may not give independent and controlling weight
to evidence of prior unfair labor practices to find a violation within
the six-month period.9 It is well established, however, that such
prior evidence of unfair labor practices is admissible as background
evidence to show the nature of the relationship between the parties. 0
The effect of the holding in the second situation described above
is a rejection of the "continuing tort"". or "continuing violation"
doctrine 12 in unfair labor practice cases where no evidence of such a
violation is found within the limitations period. Under the continu-
ing tort doctrine, where there is evidence to establish an unfair labor
practice prior to the limitations period against the party charged, an
unfair labor practice is said to continue into the present limitations
period even if no acts or evidence within the six-month period can
support the violation.'3  The same theory applies to an employer's
motivation.' 4 The company or union may rebut the inference that
such prior conduct continued into the present time period by pro-
ducing evidence to show that its earlier conduct or motive has not
continued. 15
In light of the rejection of the continuing tort doctrine, the third
situation discussed by the Supreme Court in Local 1424, 1AM becomes
important. That situation is where insubstantial evidence-as con-
trasted to substantial or to no evidence-of an unfair labor practice
is found within the limitations period.' 6
In NLRB v. MacMillan Ring-Free Oil Company,'17 the Ninth Cir-
cuit specifically addressed itself to this third situation, which was
raised in the dictum of Local 1424, 1AM. The NLRB found that the
company had violated subsections 8 (a) (1) and 8 (a) (5) of the National
Labor Relations Act' s by failing to bargain in good faith with the
certified bargaining representative of its production and maintenance
employees, the Oil, Chemical, and Atomic Workers International Un-
ion, AFL-CIO.' 9 The company's refusal to bargain was established as
9 Teamsters Union, 121 N.L.R.B. 727, 738 (1958).
10 See, e.g., Superior Engraving Co. v. NLRB, 183 F.2d 783, 791 (7th Cir.
1950); News Printing Co., 116 N.L.R.B. 210, 212 (1956); Universal Oil Prods.
Co., 108 N.L.R.B. 68, 69-70 (1954); Greenville Cotton Oil Co, 92 N.L.R.B. 1033,
1034 (1950), af'd, 197 F.2d 451, 453 (5th Cir. 1952).
". See NLRB v. Pennwoven, Inc., 194 F.2d 521, 526 (3d Cir. 1952).
12 See Local 1424, IAM v. NLRB, 362 U.S. 411, 422-23 (1960).
's NLRB v. Southern Transp., Inc., 355 F.2d 978, 981 (8th Cir. 1966); see
Retail Clerks Local 344, 136 N.L.R.B. 1270, 1289 (1962).
14 See News Printing Co., 116 N.L.R.B. 210 (1956).
'5 See Retail Clerks Local 344, 136 N.L.R.B. 1270, 1275, 1289 (1962).
16 Local 1424, IAM v. NLRB, 362 U.S. 411, 421 (1960).
17 394 F.2d 26 (9th Cir. 1968), reversing 160 N.L.R.B. 877 (1966).
Is NLRA §§ 8 (a) (1), (5), 29 U.S.C. §§ 158 (a) (1), (5) (1964).
19 NLRB v. MacMillan Ring-Free Oil Co., 394 F.2d 26, 27-28 (9th Cir,
1968).
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the cause of the union's 1964 strike.20 In its appeal of the NLRB's
decision to the Ninth Circuit, MacMillan objected to the NLRB's find-
ings on the basis of the statute of limitations in section 10(b).21 The
Ninth Circuit reversed the NLRB's decision,22 holding that the evidence
of a violation within the six-month limitations period was too insub-
stantial to support the charge that an unfair labor practice had oc-
curred within the six-month period.23 The court found that the NLRB
had relied primarily upon events occurring prior to the limitations
period to show the unfair labor practice within the six-month period.24
Due to an agreement between the parties that bargaining be post-
poned during a period of industry-wide negotiations, the company
and the union had met only once to negotiate a new collective bar-
gaining agreement during the six-month limitations period.2 5 The
court of appeals held that there was insufficient evidence from the
fact that there was only one meeting between the parties, within the
six-month limitations period, to establish that the company had re-
fused to bargain in good faith with the union.26
Hence, the Ninth Circuit in MacMillan held that primary reliance
upon evidence of events prior to the six-month limitations period
would not be allowed to establish an unfair labor practice within
that period if only insubstantial evidence of the unfair labor practice
within the six-month period was found.
The MacMillan decision not only applied the dictum of Local 1424,
LAM to a litigated dispute,'27 it also clarified for the NLRB the quan-
tum of evidence that must be found within the limitations period be-
fore evidence originating prior to the six-month period would be ad-
missible to support the inference that the violator's previous conduct
or motive has continued. When the second situation raised and an-
swered by the Supreme Court in Local 1424, lAM, holding that the con-
tinuing tort doctrine will not be applied when no evidence of an unfair
labor practice violation continuation is found within the limitations
period, is combined with the third situation mentioned in Local 1424,
1AM, but answered in MacMillan, holding that the continuing tort
doctrine will not be applied when insubstantial evidence of such
continuation is found within the limitations period, the result is a
complete rejection of the continuing tort doctrine in unfair labor
practice cases where there is less than substantial evidence that the
20 Id. at 28.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 33.
28 Id.
24 Id.
25 See id. at 28.
26 Id. at 29.
27 See id. at 32.
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violation occurred during the six--month period. In other words, the
prior conduct or motive of the party charged can only be said to
have continued when substantial evidence of the violation is found
within the limitations period.2  The MacMillan decision completes
the federal law concerning the weight to be given evidence of pre-
vious unfair labor practices which occur prior to the limitations
period.
In arriving at its decision in MacMillan, the Ninth Circuit relied
upon what it called the News Printing-Universal Oil-Tennessee Knit-
ting Mills doctrine.29 In News Printing Company,30 the NLRB found
that the trial examiner had relied primarily upon a previous NLRB
decision against the company for wage discrimination against certain
employees because of their union activities and found little evidence,
standing alone, to substantiate an unfair labor practice in the instant
case within the six-month limitations period. The Board held that
independent and controlling weight could not be given to such prior
evidence. 3 ' In Universal Oil Products Company,32 and In re Ten-
nessee Knitting Mills,3 3 the Board found that the companies had,
in each case, dominated and supported an employees' association
more than six months prior to the filing of the charge. The Board
held that the inference of an unfair labor practice could not be said
to have continued into the limitations period since only insubstantial
evidence of the practice was found within the six-month period.3 4
These three NLRB decisions have been followed for the most part
by the NLRB.-8 Thus, these Board decisions and the Local 1424, 1AM
opinion indicate that the Ninth Circuit's rejection of the continuing
28 See id. at 33; see also NLRB v. Bakers Local 50, 245 F.2d 542, 547
(2d Cir. 1957); Merrill Transp. Co., 141 N.L.R.B. 1089, 1097 (1963); Longshore-
men's Local 1418, 102 N.L.R.B. 720, 730 (1953).
29 NLRB v MacMillan Ring-Free Oil Co., 394 F.2d 26, 32 (9th Cir. 1968).
The same three cases were mentioned by the Supreme Court in Local 1424,
LAM when it raised the question whether, under section 10(b), evidence of
unfair labor practices occurring prior to the limitations period could be ad-
mitted where only insubstantial evidence of unfair labor practices is found
within the limitations period. See Local 1424, IAM v. NLRB, 362 U.S. 411,
421 (1960).
30 116 N.L.R.B. 210 (1956).
31 Id at 212.
32 108 N.L.R.B. 68 (1954).
33 88 N.L.R.B. 1103 (1950).
34 Universal Oil Prods. Co., 108 N.L.R.B. 68, 69-70 (1954); In re Tennessee
Knitting Mills, 88 N.L.R.B. 1103, 1105 (1950).
35 See, e.g., Gold Merit Packing Co., 142 N.L.R.B. 205, 206, 208 (1963);
Merrill Transp. Co., 141 N.L.R.B. 1089, 1097 (1963); Retail Clerks Local 344,
136 N.L.R.B. 1270, 1284 (1962); Inland Seas Boat Co., 131 N.L.R.B. 706, 709
(1961); Breckinridge Gasoline Co., 127 N.L.R.B. 1462, 1465 (1960).
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tort doctrine in unfair labor practices is not a new theory. 6 But the
Ninth Circuit is the first circuit court, and the highest court to date,
to have squarely held the doctrine completely inapplicable to the
factual situation in MacMillan.
Although elimination of the possibility of using insubstantial evi-
dence during the six-month period will make it more difficult for
the NLRB to establish an unfair labor practice against a previous
violator, it does not seem unfair in light of the purpose of section
10(b)37 to make the Board prove by substantial evidence that the
earlier motive or conduct continued into the limitations period.
NLRB decisions have been consistent in holding that acts and con-
duct of the party charged with violating the National Labor Relations
Act must be found within the six-month period, or be found to have
extended into that period, in order to support the inference that the
prior motive has continued into the limitations period.3 8
Moreover, the history and purpose of section 10 (b) as articulated
by Congress8 9 supports the Ninth Circuit's decision. The provision
in section 10(b) creating the six-month statute of limitations did not
appear in section 10(b) of the original National Labor Relations Act,40
but was added by amendment in 1947.41 The purpose for enacting
section 10 (b)'s statute of limitations was stated by Congress in 1957:
It has not been unusual for the Board, in the past, to issue its com-
plaints years after an unfair practice was alleged to have occurred,
and after records have been destroyed, witnesses have gone else-
where, and recollections of the events in question have become dim,
and confused. Allowing 6 months for filing a charge ... does not
seem unreasonable. 42
As the Ninth Circuit stated in MacMillan, the stabilization of bar-
gaining relationships is "hardly enhanced by the possibility that one
36 As early as 1952 two federal courts rejected the continuing tort doc-
trine as contrary to the spirit of section 10(b). NLRB v. Pennwoven, Inc.,
194 F.2d 521, 526 (3d Cir. 1952); Stewart-Warner Corp. v. NLRB, 194 F.2d 207,
209 (4th Cir. 1952). However, there was no discussion in these cases of how
much weight should be given evidence of unfair labor practices occurring prior
to the limitations period in a later NLRB proceeding.
While the continuing tort doctrine has been recognized in other areas of
the law, it appears to be inapplicable in unfair labor practice cases. Local
1424, IAM v. NLRB, 362 U.S. 411, 423-24 n.15 (1960).
87 See text accompanying notes 43-44 infra.
38 See, e.g., Wahlgren Magnetics, 132 N.L.R.B. 1613, 1618 n.4 (1961); Peter-
son Constr. Corp., 128 N.L.R.B. 969, 993 n.5 (1960); Yutana Barge Lines, Inc.,
123 N.L.R.B. 1073, 1081 n.3 (1959); H.R. McBride Constr. Co., 122 N.L.R.B. 1634,
1637 n.4 (1959); Engineers Local 12, 119 N.L.R.B. 307, 323 n.7 (1957).
39 See text accompanying notes 42-46 infra.
40 NLRA, 49 Stat. 453-54 (1935).
41 Labor-Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 146 (1947).
42 H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 40 (1947), partially quoted in
NLRB v. MacMillan Ring-Free Oil Co., 394 F.2d 26, 32 (9th Cir. 1968).
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party may dredge up events . . . in the guise of 'evidence' designed
to 'shed light' on the more recent conduct, and base unfair labor
practice charges primarily upon such bygone events."43 This very
short statute of limitations indicates that Congress felt that indus-
trial peace could best be accomplished by not permitting the initiation
of litigation for conduct which had ceased more than six months pre-
viously. 44 While the section 10(b) limitations period has been criti-
cized,45 it is probable that "[w]hatever the term of the statute of
limitations there will be objections made to it. '46
The rejection of the possibility of using insubstantial evidence
of acts occurring during the six-month period as the means by which
evidence of acts occurring prior to that period may be admissible to
establish an unfair labor practice is also justified and, moreover,
significant because it equalizes the previous violator's standing with
that of the other party for future negotiations. Under the continu-
ing tort doctrine, the party against whom the unfair labor practice
was found to have been committed would be on unequal footing with
the other bargaining parties in all future collective bargaining since
one party, once having committed a violation, would be subject in
the future to an unfair labor practice charge whenever he committed
any new injurious act against the other party, no matter how insub-
stantial.
In conclusion, the MacMilan decision holds that the conduct or
motive of a previous violator of the National Labor Relations Act
can be said to have continued into the six-month limitations period
if and only if the Board can find substantial evidence of an unfair
labor practice within the limitations period. If only insubstantial
evidence of an unfair labor practice is found within the statutory
period, the prior conduct and motivation of the person charged with
such violation can be used only as background evidence, and cannot
be primarily relied upon to establish an unfair labor practice within
the six-month period. Suspicion, remote inferences, and guesswork
will no longer be allowed as a substitute for substantial proof in
order to find a violation of the National Labor Relations Act within
the limitations period.47 "Put another way, with only a slight grasp
43 NLRB v. MacMillan Ring-Free Oil Co., 394 F.2d 26, 32 (9th Cir. 1968).
44 Michelman, State Power to Govern Concerted Employee Activities,
74 HARV. L. REv. 641, 657-58 (1961).
45 See Shaw, Labor Law For The Average Lawyer's Labor Practice, 28
ORE. L. REv. 138, 145 (1949); S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 5
(1947) (minority report), where section 10(b) was attacked by its opponents as
"the shortest statute of limitations known to the law thereby offering a pre-
mium to those employers who conceal commission of unfair labor practices."
46 93 CoNG. REc. 4283 (1947) (remarks of Senator Smith, a sponsor of the
1947 Amendments).
47 Riggs Distler & Co. v. NLRB, 327 F.2d 575, 580 (4th Cir. 1963).
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on the 10(b) tip of a dragon's tail, General Counsel" is not permitted
to pull in the dragon."40
B.S.W.
48 NLRA § 3(d), 29 U.S.C. § 153(d) (1964). The General Counsel of the
NLRB, appointed by the President of the United States, supervises all attor-
neys employed by the NLRB, and has final authority on behalf of the NLRB
to prosecute complaints before the Board.
40 United States Gypsum Co., 143 N.L.R.B. 1122, 1132 n.3 (1963).
